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In Brief
Gruber et al. presented metatool
problems to New Caledonian crows,
where each stage of the problem was out
of sight of the others. Crows had to
mentally represent the location and
identities of tools and apparatuses to
solve the problems correctly. These
results show that New Caledonian crows
can preplan several behaviors ahead
while using tools..
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One of themysteries of animal problem-solving is the
extent to which animals mentally represent problems
in their minds. Humans can imagine both the solution
to a problemand the stages along theway [1–3], such
as when we plan one or two moves ahead in chess.
The extent to which other animals can do the same
is far less clear [4–25]. Here, we presented New Cale-
donian crows with a series of metatool problems
where each stage was out of sight of the others and
the crows had to avoid either a distractor apparatus
containing a non-functional tool or a non-functional
apparatus containing a functional tool. Crows were
able to mentally represent the sub-goals and goals
of metatool problems: crows kept in mind the loca-
tion and identities of out-of-sight tools and appara-
tuses while planning and performing a sequence of
tool behaviors. This provides the first conclusive ev-
idence that birds can plan several moves aheadwhile
using tools.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From Ko¨hler’s early work on insight in chimpanzees [25] through
to contemporary animal problem-solving studies investigating
water displacement [26–28], sequential problem-solving [7, 8,
19, 23, 29, 30], hook-making [23, 31], connectivity [19, 32], grav-
ity [32–35], and planning [18, 22, 36, 37], one key question has
been the extent to which animals use mental trial and error. Den-
nett [38] famously referred to animals with this ability as Popper-
ian creatures because their ‘‘hypotheses die in their stead.’’ That
is, by being able to mentally represent different states of the
world and the potential outcome of actions directed toward
changing these states, an animal can try out different courses
of action in their heads and then avoid ones that might kill
them, or reduce their chances of reproduction, in the real world.
While such imaginings have a clear adaptive value, many famous
examples of animal problem-solving can be explained by mech-
anisms other than mental trial and error, such as perceptual-mo-686 Current Biology 29, 686–692, February 18, 2019 ª 2019 The Aut
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and trial-and-error learning [44]. At present, therefore, we have a
limited understanding of the planning capabilities of animals in
general [4–6, 9–17, 45], let alone their capacity to plan several
moves ahead while using tools [4, 7, 8, 18, 19, 21, 23].
New Caledonian (NC) crows are a perfect species to test this
possibility, given their complex tool behaviors in the wild [46]
and their ability to solve problems involving long sequences of
tool-related behavior [7, 8]. While research to date has shown
that NC crows can solve metatool problems [7, 8, 47], it is not
clear whether these crows are mentally representing and plan-
ning out behaviors or are solving the problem on a more
moment-by-moment basis using chaining and perceptual-motor
feedback loops [7, 40, 48, 49]. Here, we tested between these
hypotheses by presenting a series of metatool problems to these
crows where each stage was out of sight of the other. Addition-
ally, we added a distractor apparatus containing a tool. In exper-
iment 1, crows had to plan using mental representations of the
sub-goals of the problem (the location and identity of a functional
tool and a distractor tool) (Figure 1A). In the stick condition,
crows had to use a stick to pull a stone from a tube (functional
sub-goal), while ignoring a tube containing another stick (distrac-
tor sub-goal), and then use this stone to release food from a plat-
form apparatus (goal). The stone condition was the mirror of this,
with the crows using a stone to get a stick, which could be used
to get food from a tube. In experiment 2, crows had to plan using
mental representations of both the sub-goals and the goal of the
problem (sub-goals, location and identity of a functional tool and
a distractor tool; goal, the identity of the goal apparatus) (Fig-
ure 1B). Here, crows were given three different trial types in
any one block of trials: the stick and stone conditions and a novel
‘‘shortcut’’ condition, where crows had to take a stone directly to
a food-baited platform (goal) while ignoring the sub-goals (sticks
placed in the tube and platform apparatus, which could not be
used to gain food from the platform). This experiment was run
to confirm that crows were representing the final goal of the
problem as well as the sub-goals. If crows were not representing
the final goal, we expected them to use the available tool to try to
gain access to one of the tools at the sub-goal stage rather than
take the tool directly to the final goal. In experiment 3, crows had
to switch from planning using mental representations of the po-
sition and location of the tools to planning using the position andhors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Figure 1. Experiments 1–3 with Each Condi-
tion
(i) Initial tool positioned in the small compartment
in front of the shield. (ii) Apparatuses containing
the tools in the left and right compartments (green
tick and red cross indicate the correct tool and the
distractor apparatus). (iii) Apparatus baited with
meat (red block).
(A) Experiment 1: Stick condition (A): Subjects must
use the short stick to get the stone (left), which can
thenbedropped into the collapsing trap-platform to
get the meat, while avoiding the distractor (the long
stick, right). Stone condition (B): Subjects must use
the stone to get the long stick (right), which can then
be used to get the meat from the long tube, while
avoiding the distractor (the stone, left).
(B) Experiment 2: Stone condition (A): Same as in
Experiment 1. Stick condition (B): Same as in
Experiment 1. Shortcut (C): Subjects must take the
stone immediately to the final apparatus baitedwith
meat while ignoring both distractor apparatuses.
(C) Experiment 3: Stick condition (A): To get the
meat from the platform, subjects must take the
stick to the tube and extract the stone while
ignoring the platform apparatus. Stone condition
(B): Subjects must take the stone to the platform
apparatus while ignoring the stick tool in the stick
apparatus. Using the stone on the platform
apparatus released the long stick, which could be
used to get meat from the tube. The black lines
indicate the outline of the wooden shield.
See also Figure S1 and Data S1.location of the apparatuses (Figure 1C). Crows were given a stick
condition, where they needed to take a stick to get a stone from a
tube (functional sub-goal), while ignoring a stone in a platform
apparatus (distractor sub-goal), and then use the stone to
release food from a platform apparatus (goal). The stone condi-
tion was a mirror of this: crows had to use a stone to get a stick
from a platform apparatus to get food from a tube, while ignoring
a stick in a tube apparatus. This tested whether the crows
could spontaneously plan while representing information they
had not had experience encoding (the identity and location of
the apparatus) (Video S1).
If crows had solved past metatool problems without planning,
we expected them to fail across our three experiments and either
not innovate the new metatool behaviors, not complete the
behavioral sequence, or not perform above chance when
deciding whether to take the tool to the functional sub-goal, dis-
tractor sub-goal, or final goal. In contrast, if NC crows are
capable of using mental representations to plan a series of tool
behaviors, in each experiment we expected them to be able to
complete the sequence and perform metatool tool use to get
the correct tool, while ignoring the distractor tool or apparatus.
On experiment 1, 14 crows were tested. Six were tested in
2017, with three being presented with the stone metatool prob-
lem first and three the stick metatool problem first. In 2018, we
presented a further eight crows with the stick problem then the
stone problem. Of the 11 crows that were first presented with
the stick metatool problem, 4 reached a criterion of 16/20 with
few errors (2 birds from 2017, 2 from 2018, range 0–5; see Fig-
ure 2A). A further three crows reached criterion within 40 trials,
and one reached criterion in 43 trials (one bird from 2017, threefrom 2018). All 11 crows were then given the stone problem as
their second condition. Two crows reached the criterion of
16/20 trials within 40 trials (one from 2017, one from 2018), while
two others did so in their 43rd trial and 46th trial, respectively (one
from 2017, one from 2018) (Figure 2B). None of the three 2017
crows that received the stone problem first reached criterion
within 40 trials (Figure 2B). However, when these crows were
then given the stick condition second, they reached criterion in
22, 23, and 24 trials respectively (Figure 2A).
Experiment 2 was presented to the eight crows in our 2018
field season. Here, crows were given one of three trial types
within each block of trials: a stick metatool trial, a stone metatool
trial (both the same as in experiment 1), or a shortcut trial. In
shortcut trials, crows had to take a stone to get food directly
from the platform apparatus (goal) while ignoring two sticks
placed inside the two sub-goal apparatuses (tube and platform),
as these sticks were non-functional for the overall goal. If crows
were not representing the final goal, we predicted they would
attempt to use the available tool to gain one of the tools at the
sub-goal stage instead of taking the tool directly to the final
goal. Thus, to pass this experiment, crows had to plan using
mental representations of both the goal and sub-goals of the
problem across the three trial types presented to them. Crows
were given blocks with these three trial types presented in a
pseudorandomized order. Three of the eight birds solved the
problem within 60 trials (20 of each condition): Neptune did so
in 25 trials, Mars in 26 trials, and Triton in 39 trials. One other
bird, Mercury, reached criterion in 69 trials (Figure 3). Clearly,
this was a more difficult problem than experiment 1 as crows
had to encode more information, namely not only the locationCurrent Biology 29, 686–692, February 18, 2019 687
Figure 2. Performance of Crows on Experiment 1
(A and B) Stick condition (A) and stone condition (B). Crows that solved the task are marked in bold.
See also Tables S1–S4 and Data S1.
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Figure 3. Performance of Crows on Experiment 2 in the First 60 Trials
Crows that solved the task are marked in bold. Mercury solved experiment 2 in trial 69 (*).
See also Table S3 and Data S1.and identity of the two tools but also the identity of the goal appa-
ratus as well.
Experiment 3was presented to three of four crows that passed
experiment 2 (one crow was excluded due to procedural prob-
lems). In all experiments to this point, crows had to plan using
mental representations of the locations and identity of the two
out-of-sight tools. In this experiment, this changed: for each
sub-goal, the same tool was placed in either a functional or
non-functional apparatus. Thus, in the stick condition, crows
had to take a stick to gain a stone from a tube (functional sub-
goal), while ignoring a stone in a platform (distractor sub-goal),
and then take the stone to extract food from a platform (goal).
In the stone condition, crows had to use a stone to gain a stick
from a platform (functional sub-goal), while ignoring a stick in a
tube (distractor sub-goal), and then use this stick to gain food.
Crows, therefore, had to plan using representations of both the
identity and location of the apparatuses, which they had never
had to do before. Crows were given 20 trials of each condition.
The three crows reached criterion within the first 20 trials of the
stick condition, scoring 18, 17, and 16 out of 20 (Figure 4A).
In contrast, no crow reached criterion within 20 trials in the
stone condition, and only one reached criterion within 60 trials
(Figure 4B).
A key signature of human foresight is preplanning, where a
mental plan is formed before movements begin to be executed.
This differs from online planning, where planning occurs during
task-related movements [1, 3]. Crows could have used online
planning in our 2017 experiment by picking up the tool and
then inspecting one apparatus, without actually interacting with
it, before moving onto another. We re-analyzed the performance
of the 2017 crows that reached criterion at either task of
experiment 1 after excluding trials where crows inspected one
apparatus while holding the tool before switching to the other.
Instead, we examined only those trials where crows took the
tool and immediately interacted with one apparatus. This al-
lowed us to examine howwell the 2017 crows performed in trialswhere only preplanning, rather than online planning, could have
been used to solve the problem. In the stick condition, two crows
were still significant when we excluded trials where crows in-
spected the problem while holding a tool. Aretha scored 12/14
correct trials (Binomial choice, p = 0.013), and Freddie scored
14/18 correct trials (Binomial choice, p = 0.031). Thus, when
looking at 2017 trials where online planning did not occur, clear
evidence of preplanning emerged. This 2017 finding is mirrored
in our 2018 data, where two crows solved the problem with
few errors (Saturn, 20/20; Triton, 16/20). In 2018, during our
training stages (see Method Details), we gave the crows experi-
ence that a trial would be stopped if they picked up a tool and
then inspected an apparatus without interacting with it. If crows
then attempted to inspect while holding a tool during experi-
ments 1–3, this was counted as an incorrect choice. This highly
stringent criterion meant that crows were unable to use online
planning across experiments 1–3 in 2018.
Our results provide conclusive evidence that some NC crows
can preplan using mental representations of the sub-goals and
goals of a metatool problem (experiments 1 and 2) and then
spontaneously switch from preplanning using mental represen-
tations of different tools to representations of different appara-
tuses (experiment 3). In experiment 1, we found that most of
the crows we tested solved a stick problem, where they had to
use a stick tool to get a stone tool and then use the stone to
get food while avoiding a distractor object (another stick). This
was despite crows not being able to view more than one stage
of the problem at a time. Four of the crows we tested showed
clear evidence of preplanning. Experiment 2 showed that NC
crows can also represent both the goal and sub-goal of a meta-
tool problem while preplanning. Four out of eight crows were
able to track both of these features of the problem, with one
crow solving this task in 25 trials and one in 26 trials. However,
this was clearly a much harder problem for the crows, possibly
because they had to mentally represent more information. This
may explain why the crows struggled despite having hadCurrent Biology 29, 686–692, February 18, 2019 689
Figure 4. Performance of Crows on Experiment 3
(A and B) Stick condition (A) and stone condition (B). Crows that solved the task are marked in bold.
See also Table S3.experience of two of the three problems presented already and
why the individual that had done best at experiment 1, Saturn,
actually failed this experiment. Finally, experiment 3 shows that
NC crows can spontaneously preplan using novel information.
Crows had not been required to mentally represent two appa-
ratus types and then choose between them at any point in our
experiment. However, when presented with a stick problem
where they had to take a stick to gain a stone from a tube while
ignoring a stick in a platform, the three crows we tested immedi-
ately preplanned using a representation of the apparatus type
and location rather than the tool type. To our knowledge, these
results are the first conclusive evidence that birds can plan
several steps ahead while using tools. Our study clearly rules
out the alternative explanations suggested for past bird perfor-
mances on sequential tool problems, where all the components
of the problem have been visible [7, 8, 29, 47, 48, 50, 51].
The crows clearly needed considerable experience ofmentally
representing tools to produce the metatool performances we
observed. Though most crows quickly solved training stage 1,
where the crows had to take one of two tools positioned together
to an out-of-sight apparatus, they took much longer in training
stage 2, where they had to take tools positioned inside different
compartments. On average, the crows made 8 errors at stage 1
before reaching criterion but 30.7 errors at stage 2. Thus, despite
both these tasks requiring mental representation, choosing
which compartment to take a tool from, rather than choosing
between two tools in the same compartment, appears to have
been much more cognitively demanding, possibly due to the
increased working memory load this task required. Without
training stage 2, it seems likely that the crows would have failed
the experiment 1, due to the extra demand imposed by having
to take one of two tools positioned inside different compartments
of the shield to an apparatus. Once crows had learned to do this,
however, they were able to mentally represent the location and
identity of tools and apparatuses while planning and performing
a three-stage behavioral sequence involving metatool use.
Interestingly, the crows did not perform as well on any of the
stone metatool tasks we presented to them. There are a number
of possible explanations for this. One is that it was harder for the690 Current Biology 29, 686–692, February 18, 2019crows to be performing stone- rather than stick-tool use while
making a decision. Tool use itself has been shown to be cogni-
tively demanding for animals [52], so it is possible that some
forms of tool use may in themselves be more demanding than
others. For example, holding the stone may have required
more attention or motor control, either due to its affordances
or because the crows had less practice holding stones than
sticks due to using sticks, but not stones, in the wild. A second
possibility is that stones were not as easy to represent as the
starting decision point in a sequence compared to sticks, which
had a downstream effect on the crows’ ability to preplan a
sequence. Still, the crows’ performance in solving the stick
metatool problem, where they had to mentally represent the
location of a stone tool, clearly shows that their ability to plan
is flexible enough to include tools they have been trained to
use, such as stones, rather than those they have evolved to
use, such as sticks.
Our results support the hypothesis that NC crows can use
mental trial and error when solving metatool problems and so
can act as Popperian creatures. The birds represented different
states of the world (the location and identity of the functional and
distractor tools, the overall goal, and the location and identity of
the different apparatus) and then used these representations to
plan out a sequence of behaviors toward an overall goal before
finally executing this plan. However, the nature of the represen-
tations that the crows are using is unclear. Are these representa-
tions of the crows’ entire trajectory or just key decision points?
Are they based only on semantic knowledge of likely outcomes,
or do they incorporate episodic elements as well? Such ques-
tions will be a focus of future work.STAR+METHODS
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Gruber (rgru908@aucklanduni.ac.nz).
EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
The study was carried out with fourteen wild caught NewCaledonian crows (Corvusmoneduloides) on the island of Grand Terre, New
Caledonia. Eight of the crows were adults more than 2 years old (Mercury, Io, Saturn, Uranus, Janis, David, Elvis, and Bob), and six
were juveniles less than one year old (Neptune, Triton, Mars, Venus, Freddie & Aretha). Based on sexual size dimorphism [53], six
crows were identified as females (Mercury, Neptune, Triton, Uranus, Janis and Aretha), and the other eight as males. The crows
were kept in family groups and housed for five months in a 10 cage outdoor aviary, with each cage measuring at least 2 3 3 x
3 m. They had access to water ad libitum, and were fed fruits and dog biscuits soaked in water. Small pieces of meat were used
as rewards. All testing happened in a compartment with no visual access to the other crows. Our work was carried out under the
approval of the University of Auckland Animal Ethics Committee (reference no. 001823).
METHOD DETAILS
We used three types of apparatus: a wooden screen, stone dropping boxes and horizontal Perspex tubes. The wooden screen
(50 3 50 3 40 cm) functioned as a visual shield and consisted of three large compartments (25 3 25 3 40 cm) on three sides of
the box, and one small compartment (53 5 x 10 cm) on the fourth side of the box, which was the starting position for the crows (Fig-
ure 2). The stone dropping boxes (henceforth called stone apparatus) were similar to those used in previous studies [23, 28] and
measured 16 3 10 3 10 cm. They were made out of clear Perspex, with the collapsing trap-platform in the box colored in white
for better visibility of the reward and the tool. On top of the box was a 12 cm long tube with a diameter of 5 cm and a slant of
30 in the middle, to prevent stick tools being pushed down the tube contacting the platform. The crows were therefore only able
to release the platform by dropping a stone down the tube. The horizontal Perspex tubes (henceforth called the stick apparatus)
were 18 cm long with a diameter of 5 cm, mounted 8 cm above a base. One of these tubes had two 1 3 3 cm holes drilled into
them close to the center, which made it easier for crows to lever out heavy stones positioned in the center of the tube. The second
tube had a continuous surface and contained a stick tool or the food reward, depending on the task it was presented in.
Procedure
Training
All crows received two training steps in this study. Training Stage 1 examined if the crows could mentally represent the identity of the
goal (the stone and stick apparatus) while moving around the wooden shield. To do this we placed a stick tool and a stone tool in one
large compartment and either the stone or stick apparatus in another large compartment. The apparatus and both tools in the large
compartmentswere randomized between trials. Due to the structure of thewooden shield the crows could not simultaneously see the
contents of more than one compartment. To solve the task the birds had to choose the correct tool and take it to the apparatus. If they
chose the wrong tool and used it to make contact with the apparatus this was counted as an error. In 2017, subjects were also al-
lowed to pick up one of the two tools, take it to the apparatus, return with this tool and swap it for the second before returning the
apparatus, as this tool swap required them to keep in mind the apparatus type. They were not allowed to take a (wrong) tool to the
apparatus, drop it and then return to take the second tool, as the crowwould be able to see the apparatus and both tools at the same
time if they did this. Therefore, the trial was interrupted by the experimenter knocking on the door and going into the compartment and
counted as an error. In 2018 however, if subjects chose the wrong tool, took it to the apparatus, but then did not interact and tried to
return to get the second tool, the trial was interrupted and this was counted as an error. This gave the crows experience that their first
choice had to be correct in order to get rewarded. In 2017, crowswere given blocks of 12 trials and had to reach a criterion of 18 out of
24 correct trials in two consecutive blocks (binomial test with alpha set at 0.05) in order to move on to Training Stage 2. This was
changed to blocks of 10 trials with a criterion of 16/20 in 2018. Training Stage 2 was the same as Training 1, in that crows had toCurrent Biology 29, 686–692.e1–e3, February 18, 2019 e1
mentally represent the apparatus while moving around the shield, with the difference that both tools were located in different
compartments (position of apparatus and both tools was randomized and counterbalanced across trials). The same rules as in
Training 1 applied for Training 2, so 2017 birds were allowed to take the tool to the apparatus and then return to swap it if they
did not interact with the apparatus, while 2018 birds were not. The training was completed when the 2017 crows reached the criterion
of 18 out of 24 correct trials in two consecutive blocks of 12 trials (binomial test with alpha set at 0.05). This was changed to blocks of
10 trials with a criterion of 16/20 in 2018.
Experiments
In Experiment 1 the crows received two conditions where they had to mentally represent and then solve two different 3-stage meta-
tool problems. In the first problem, crows had to use a stick to gain access to a stone that then could be used to gain food (Figure 2A).
In the second problem, crows had to use a stone to gain access to a stick that could then be used to gain food (Figure 2B). Each stage
of the problem was housed in one of the three large compartments of the wooden shield (Figure 1), meaning that the crows were
unable to see more than one stage of the problem simultaneously. At the start of a trial the crows entered the testing room and
observed that the small compartment of the wooden shield, which would later house a tool, was empty. They were then allowed
to inspect the rest of the experimental setup for 1 min. If they did not inspect each large compartment, each side of the wooden
screen was baited with a small piece of meat to ensure crows had observed each problem stage. After the inspection, the experi-
menter entered the room, and placed the starting tool in the small compartment. The crow could now pick up this tool and use it
to extract the tools housed in the apparatus. The time between inspecting the set up and picking up the first tool was not more
than 15 s. Crows were given trials of the first condition until they reached a criterion of 16 out of 20 correct trials (binomial test
with alpha set at 0.015) or until they had been presented with 40 trials. If crows scored 8/10 or in their final block of the 40 trials,
we continued testing for a final block to see if they would reach criterion.
Crows were then given trials of the second condition. In 2017 conditions were randomized between crows while in 2018 crows
received the stick condition then the stone condition. We made this change because of how difficult the 2017 crows had found
the stone condition to solve. We hoped presenting the experiments in this order would increase the chance of crows’ successfully
solving the stone problem and so allow us to run this study quicker, creating time for other experiments (such as Experiment 2 and 3)
to be run before the crows were released back into the wild. Within both conditions the position of the functional and distractor
apparatuses were counterbalanced and randomized between trials. The location of the initial tool and food was always in the
same position across trials. A trial was counted as a failure and was interrupted by the experimenter if the crow (a) took the initial
tool to the distractor apparatus containing the same tool type (a first action error), (b) obtained the functional tool with the initial
tool but then inserted it in the distractor apparatus (a second action error), or (c) took the initial tool directly to the final apparatus
containing food (a third action error). In 2017, it was not counted as an error if the crow took a tool to an apparatus but did not interact
with it, and then took the tool to the other apparatus. In 2018, this was counted as an error, with the trial being stopped if the crow did
attempt this behavior (Video S1, Experiment 1).
Experiment 2 was highly similar to Experiment 1 except that within any one block crows were given three trials types: a stick meta-
tool trial identical to the set-up presented in Experiment 1, a stonemetatool trial identical to the set-up presented in Experiment 1 and
a novel shortcut trial. In this latter trial each crow had to take a stone directly to the baited platform apparatus while ignoring two sticks
placed inside the two sub-goal apparatus (tube and platform), as these sticks were non-functional for the overall goal. Crows there-
fore had to represent both the sub-goal and goal of the problem in order to solve these trials. Crows were given blocks of trials until
they reached a criterion of 16 out of 20 correct trials (binomial test with alpha set at 0.015) or until they had been presented with
120 trials. Note it was not possible to run a stick short cut condition where crows would have needed to take a short stick tool directly
to a tube apparatus, while ignoring two apparatus containing stones. This is because we would have had to change the stick size:
the short stick would have been non-functional for the tube apparatus baited with food, as it was too short. Changing the stick size
would have made it impossible to know if successful performances were because crows were representing the final goal, or simply
changing their behavior because the stick size had changed (Video S1, Experiment 2).
Experiment 3 was a repeat of Experiment 1 with one key difference: instead of two different tools being presented in the same sub-
goal apparatus, now the same tool was presented in the two different sub-goal apparatuses. Two crows (Mercury, Triton) were first
given trials of the stick condition (where they had to use a stick to get a stone from a tube while avoiding a stone in a platform appa-
ratus), until they reached a criterion of 16 out of 20 correct trials (binomial test with alpha set at 0.015). They were then tested with the
stone condition, where they had to take a stone to get a stick from platform apparatus, while avoiding a stone in a tube. Again, they
were tested until they reached the same criterion. One crow, Mars, was given the stone condition first, and then the stick condition
(Video S1, Experiment 3).
Prior Experience
None of the crows had prior experience of mentally representing multi-stage tool problems, or of using tools as metatools, before
being given Experiments 1-3. However, crows were given a number of different tasks involving tool use before being participating
in this study. Five of the six 2017 crows (Aretha being the exception) participated in a tool functionality study similar to [51] where
they learnt to choose the correct tool for the right job when presented with the stone apparatus, the stick apparatus and both stick
and stone tools (see SI for further details, see figure S1). The 2018 crows received the same tool functionality problems, aside from the
motivation and tool functionality conditions, due to time constraints. Additionally, there was one key change to the criterion used
throughout these 2018 tests: if the crows chose a tool, then took it to an apparatus but did not interact with it, and then attemptede2 Current Biology 29, 686–692.e1–e3, February 18, 2019
to swap tools, this was counted as an error, unlike in 2017. All 2017 and 2018 crowswere also presentedwith two problemswhere the
stick and stone tools were presented out-of-sight of the apparatus, using a wooden screen (see SI for further details and diagram).
These problems where highly similar to the training stages we describe above, with the key difference being that barriers were used,
rather than the shield we used throughout our experiment. Three 2017 (Janice, David and Freddie) and two 2018 crows (Mercury and
Uranus) had also been given problems where they had to choose a tool, and after a time delay, take the tool to an apparatus to gain
food. In Condition 1, crows were shown a stick apparatus (described above) that was baited with food in Compartment 1.The crows
were then moved to Compartment 2. Here, the crows were presented with various objects, including a stick tool. After the crows had
chosen one of these objects they were given access to Compartment 1 again. Choosing the stick tool in Compartment 2, rather than
the other objects, and then transporting it back to Compartment 1, allowed the crows to access the reward. During testing, crows
were presented with novel-tool apparatus combinations but the same temporal pattern of events.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Trials were video recorded from four different angles (two Sony 4K XAVC S, one Panasonic HC-X920M, and one GoPro Hero 3+). All
statistical tests were conducted in R [54] and are two-tailed. Twenty percent of the videos from all four angles were coded by a blind
coder and the inter-observer reliability was 1 (Cohen’s Kappa, R package ‘irr’ [55]). Binomial analyses were run, with the probability of
a correct choice at 0.5.Current Biology 29, 686–692.e1–e3, February 18, 2019 e3
